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Esports Corruption: Gambling, Doping, and 
Global Governance 
JOHN T. HOLDEN, RYAN M. RODENBERG & ANASTASIOS KABURAKIS1†
ABSTRACT 
 The world of esports is fast becoming a mainstream 
form of competition and entertainment. While there is 
debate over whether esports should be recognized as a 
sport, the emergence of competitive video gaming has 
seen a rise in many of the problems associated with 
traditional sport including: doping, gambling-related 
match-fixing and non-gambling related corruption. 
Indeed, the esports gambling market has quickly 
surpassed the total legal sports wagering market in the 
United States, including daily fantasy sports. This 
paper examines esports growth and the evolving 
integrity challenges being faced by players, tournament 
organizers, gamblers, sponsors, politicians, and fans. 
Esports, like traditional sports, faces both internal and 
external corruption-related threats. Internal threats 
facing competitive video gaming include the use of 
performance-enhancing drugs and match-fixing. The 
industry also faces external pressure from a large 
gambling industry that exists in both regulated and 
unregulated markets. The entire esports ecosystem is 
now facing increased scrutiny from various 
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governments who have expressed concerns about how 
to regulate the games, and the vast derivative markets.    
“Instead of trying to make them traditional sports bettors, we’re 
giving them their own playground.” 
– Kasper Nemeth, Danske Spil’s esports manager2 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 20, 2016, Bloomberg Businessweek published an article 
titled, “Virtual Weapons Are Turning Teen Gamers into Serious 
Gamblers.”3 For many readers, the article marked their first 
introduction to the game Counter-Strike: Global Offensive or CS:GO, 
as it is commonly referred to online.4 It was reported by Brustein and 
Novy-Williams that a tournament in Columbus, Ohio had generated 
more than 71 million online views in four days.5 In addition to adding 
CS:GO to the mainstream vernacular, the Bloomberg article also 
introduced readers to the concept of skins gambling.6 In August 2015, 
a report issued by Eilers Research projected that esports wagering 
would reach $23.5 billion by the year 2020.7 
 
 2.  Eben Novy-Williams, Legal Sports Books Get Ready for Billions in E-Sports Betting, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 26, 2016, 12:21 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-
26/legal-sports-books-get-ready-for-billions-in-e-sports-betting. 
 3.  Joshua Brustein & Eben Novy-Williams, Virtual Weapons Are Turning Teen Gamers 
Into Serious Gamblers, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 20, 2016), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-virtual-guns-counterstrike-gambling/. See also 
Shaun Assael, Skin in the Game, ESPN (Jan. 20, 2017), 
http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/18510975/how-counter-strike-turned-teenager-
compulsive-gambler. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. Comparatively, more fans tuned in – online – to watch the 2014 League of 
Legends world championship final, 27 million worldwide, than the respective year’s World 
Series (23.5 million), NBA Finals (17.9 million), and Stanley Cup finals (6 million); twitch.tv, 
whence most gaming video feeds are streamed, was sold to Amazon in 2014 for just under a 
billion dollars, and generates more online traffic than ESPN, MLB, and WWE.com combined. 
See Stephanie Apstein, E-sports nation: How competitive gaming became a flourishing sport, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.si.com/more-sports/2015/10/29/esports-
competitive-video-gaming.  
 6.  Id. Sarkar defined a skin as: “an alternate outfit of some kind, whether for a character 
or item. In the particular context of Counter-Strike: Global Offensive, a skin — also known as 
a “finish” — is a unique visual design for a weapon, whether it’s a firearm or a knife.” Samit 
Sarkar, How do Counter-Strike Global Offensive skins work, POLYGON (July 11, 2016, 10:30 
AM), http://www.polygon.com/2016/7/11/12129136/counter-strike-global-offensive-cs-go-
skins-explainer.  
 7.  Chris Grove & Adam Krejcik, eSports Betting: It’s Real, and Bigger Than You Think, 
EILERS RESEARCH (Aug. 19, 2015). For comparison the size of Nevada’s legal sports gambling 
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In 2013, Professor Dan Burk called the rise of video gaming “one 
of the most astounding and largely underappreciated developments 
accompanying the recent proliferation of mass-market computer 
technology.”8 Burk highlighted the unique feature of video gaming 
whereby player performances are represented by digital depictions, as 
opposed to the traditional broadcast model where video of actual 
human beings is projected onto television screens.9 Burk noted that 
esports are a representative title that encompasses a wide-variety of 
sub-groups of games, ranging from sports games with popular titles, 
including “FIFA football (soccer),” first-person shooter games with 
games such as Counter-Strike and what Burk terms real-time strategy 
games, including the game StarCraft.10 While esports is somewhat 
nascent to the North American audience in 2017, Comerford noted that 
in South Korea the StarCraft competitive video gaming competitions 
emerged from the 1990s financial crisis.11 Comerford reported that the 
South Korean esports infrastructure for StarCraft II is run through 
GomTV, the designated broadcast partner for Blizzard Entertainment 
(the maker of StarCraft and StarCraft II), in South Korea.12 
Hollist noted in 2014 that crowds, upwards of 40,000 people, 
were attending certain esports world championships.13 That same year, 
Hollist observed that the massive interest in esports had drawn the 
 
market was estimated to be $4.2 billion in 2015. Dustin Gouker, Nevada Sportsbooks Took 
Record $4.2 Billion in Wagers In 2015, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Feb. 4, 2016 11:14 AM), 
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/7902/nevada-record-sports-betting-2015/. In 2014, RAND 
estimated that the size of the heroin market in the United States was $27 billion. Beau Kilmer 
et al., How Big is the U.S. Market for Illegal Drugs?, RAND CORP. (2014), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9770.html. For comparison to a prominent legal 
activity, in 2015 the global market value for recorded music was $15 billion. Hugh McIntyre, 
For The First Time In 20 Years, The Global Music Industry Gained Ground in 2015, FORBES 
(Apr. 13, 2016, 8:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/hughmcintyre/2016/04/13/for-the-
first-time-in-20-years-the-global-music-industry-gained-ground-in-2015/#47a7745a6b1a. 
 8.  Dan L. Burk, Owning E-Sports: Proprietary Rights In Professional Computer 
Gaming, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1535, 1535 (2013). 
 9.  See generally, Id. 
 10.  Id. at 1538. 
 11.  Sean Comerford, International Intellectual Property Rights and the Future of Global 
“E-Sports”, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 623, 628 (2012), citing Kristie Lu Stout, StarCraft II Shakes 
up S. Korea’s ‘National Sport’, CNN TECH: DIGITAL BIZ (July 27, 2010, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/gaming.gadgets/07/27/south.korea.starcraft. 
 12.  Id. at 631. 
 13.  Katherine E. Hollist, Time to be Grown-Ups About Video Gaming: The Rising 
eSports Industry and the Need for Regulation, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 824 (2015) citing Paul 
Tassi, 40,000 Korean Fans Watch SSW Win 2014 ‘League of Legends’ World Championship, 
FORBES (Oct. 19, 2014, 11:53 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2014/10/19/40000-live-korean-fans-watch-ssw-win-
2014-league-of-legends-world-championship/#74a43e105a6d. 
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attention of both Sony and Microsoft who sought to enter the esports 
world by launching their own esports leagues.14 Hollist argued that the 
current esports structure offers minimal protection to the contestants, 
including some who may be as young as fourteen years of age.15 The 
competitive nature of professional esports has led some players to seek 
advantages from focus-enhancing nootropics including Adderall, and 
subsequently led to the implementation of drug testing in one major 
league.16 Seo argued that esports has “emerged as a distinct consumer-
driven segment within the larger market for computer games,” noting 
that esports growth has been a collaboration between companies 
reacting to stakeholder groups, including consumers and esports 
organizers.17 Projections estimate a global esports audience reaching 
over 420 million people in 2019, with direct revenue growing to over 
a billion dollars within the same timeframe.18 Approximately 61% of 
the U.S. population, 194 million, currently engage in some form of 
gaming.19 While game manufacturers may be responding to demands 
 
14. Id. at 829 citing Eddie Makuch, Microsoft Announces Halo eSports League, GAMESPOT 
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.gamespot.com/articles/microsoft-announces-halo-esports-
league/1100- 6423409/; and Vikki Blake, Sony Launches Esports League on Playstation 4, 
IGN (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.ign.com/articles/2014/10/15/sony-launches-esports-league-
onplaystation-4; see also Samuel Lingle, Sony Embraces esports with PlayStation Official 
League, THE DAILY DOT (Oct 15, 2014 2:13PM),  http://www.dailydot.com/esports/sony-
playstation-official-league/. 
 15.  Hollist, supra note 12 at 831. The risk of exploitation and other dangers child athletes 
are exposed to have been well documented in numerous other sports. See Ricardo Gentzsch, 
Transfer of Adolescents, 9 INT’L SPORTS L. REV. PANDEKTIS 108 (2011); see also Jean Claude 
Mbvoumin, Which Protection for Minors in the 21st Century Football, PLAY THE GAME 
(2015), http://www.playthegame.org/media/4162541/28-10-900-Wednesday-Jean-Claude-
Mbvoumin.pdf; see also Samuel O. Reglado, “Latin Players on the Cheap:” Professional 
Baseball Recruitment in Latin America and the Neocolonialist Tradition, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 9 (2000); Michael S. Schmidt, Dominicans Try Shots to Boost Rising Players, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/sports/baseball/25dominican.html?_r=0. 
 16.  Hollist, supra note 12 at 833; see also Brett Molina, Key eSports Group to Create 
Policy on PEDs, USA TODAY (July 23, 2015 1:57 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/gaming/2015/07/23/esports-drug-testing/30560219. 
Contrary to skill specificity in mainstream sport, professional gamers may have to learn a new 
game at regular intervals and depending on competition and prize trends, thus rendering the 
pressure toward attention-enhancing medication more prevalent. E.g., Tom Pitt Professional 
video gaming is a uniquely demanding sport. We need more than a drugs crackdown to fix it, 
INDEP. (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/professional-video-gaming-is-
a-uniquely-demanding-sport-we-need-more-than-a-drugs-crackdown-to-fix-10460201.html. 
 17.  Yuri Seo, Electronic Sports: A New Marketing Landscape of the Experience 
Economy, 29 J. MKTG. MGMT. 1542, 1555 (2013). 
 18.  Henry Young, Seven-figure salaries, sold-out stadiums: Is pro video gaming a 
sport?, CNN (May 31, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/31/sport/esports-is-
professional-gaming-a-sport/. 
 19.  Id. 
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of various stakeholders, other business developers have emerged to fill 
the demands of consumers that the video game and esports 
manufacturers are unable or unwilling to fill directly. With the 
increasing popularity of esports and its emergence into the mainstream, 
the dark side of esports and derivative game product gambling is being 
illuminated. 
Internationally, the markets of South Korea and China are the 
most established internationally representing 23% of global revenues 
in 2016.20 South Korea has historically dominated the competitive 
practice of esports, but has also been a front-runner in regards to 
government recognition and regulation of the industry.21 Current 
forecasts envision a near future with esports becoming a truly global 
enterprise with a viewing audience of 435 million people by 2019.22 
The growth is being partially fueled by a rise in interest in both North 
America and Europe. In Europe, both France and Great Britain have 
launched governing bodies, which represent an important step towards 
sustainable growth and the development of political capital.23 While 
esports are growing on national levels, their growth in complementary 
transnational markets, such as the betting market and specifically skins 
wagering, is partially responsible for the rapid ascension to mainstream 
recognition.24 
I. ESPORTS GAMBLING 
The esports world has positioned itself along the side of other 
 
 20.  See Global Esports Market Report: Revenues to Jump to $463M in 2016 as US Leads 
the Way, NEWZOO (Jan. 25, 2016), https://newzoo.com/insights/articles/global-esports-
market-report-revenues-to-jump-to-463-million-in-2016-as-us-leads-the-way/. 
 21.  South Korea launched the first team-based esports league, the StarCraft ProLeague 
in 2003; the league ran until 2016, when it was announced that the league would cease 
operations, in part as a result of ongoing problems with match-fixing. See Brian Ashcraft, The 
End of an Era for StarCraft and South Korea, KOTAKU (Oct. 18, 2016 6:10AM), 
http://kotaku.com/the-end-of-an-era-for-starcraft-and-south-korea-1787917075. 
 22.  See The Explosive Growth of Esports and Why It Matters to Everyone, NEWZOO 
(2016), available at: http://cga.global/research/CGA_Newzoo_Esports_Growth_2016.pdf. 
 23.  Peter Lewin & Jas Purewal, Esports Predictions: Great Growth in 2016, Storm 
Clouds for 2017, GAMESINDUSTRY (Jan. 15, 2016), 
http://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2016-12-15-esports-predictions-great-growth-in-
2016-storm-clouds-for-2017. 
 24.  Joss Wood, New Report: Esports Audience Could Almost Double to 600 Million by 
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major sports organizations through sponsorships and partnerships with 
a wide variety of recognizable brands including: Coca Cola, 
McDonald’s, Arby’s, Nissan, Red Bull, FritoLay, and technology 
companies well aligned with esports such as Intel, Microsoft, Sony, 
and Google/YouTube.25 While moving towards sponsorships with 
mainstream enterprises like other sports leagues, the esports world has 
also given rise to a lucrative gambling market, much like traditional 
mainstream sports.26 Robins noted that while the gambling market on 
esports is meaningful in size, it is dominated by a few entities.27 Robins 
further noted that there is not one entity that has cornered the market 
across various esports titles, with the esports gambling market still 
developing.28 Robins observed that in connection with real currencies 
being wagered on esports matches there is also a market for virtual 
items to be wagered.29 
The market for virtual weapon designs as currency opened on 
August 14, 2013. According to Eric Yu, the makers of CS:GO, Valve, 
introduced the “Arms Deal Update.”30 The update allowed players the 
ability to obtain locked crates, while playing the game, that could be 
unlocked by purchasing a key from a company-operated store.31 Inside 
the crate were “decorative weapons skins,” that could be bought, sold, 
traded, and gambled.32 Yu noted that the website CS:GO Lounge was 
the first to allow users to bet the skins they obtained on a game played 
by professional players.33 Yu noted that as CS:GO Lounge grew in 
 
 25.  Blake Robins, The Esports Landscape—July 2016, MEDIUM (July 21, 2016), 
https://medium.com/ludlow-ventures/the-esports-landscape-july-2016-
2350655dfa63#.em98ry1u7. See also John Gaudiosi, Big brands gravitating towards eSports, 
FORTUNE (July 24, 2014, 11:44 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/07/24/esports-sponsors/. 
Traditional sports leagues such as the NBA have begun to launch their own esports leagues, 
which is coupled with various ownership stakes held by players, and owners in different 
esports entities. See Jacob Wolf, The NBA and Esports: How We Got Here, ESPN (Feb. 17, 
2017), http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/18702213/the-nba-esports-how-got-here. 
 26.  Anastasios Kaburakis, et al., Inevitable: Sports Gambling, State Regulation, and the 
Pursuit of Revenue, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 28 (2015). Various estimates of the size 
of the sports gambling industry estimate that upwards of several hundred billion dollars are 
wagered annually in legal and illegal markets. Id. 
 27.  Robins supra note 25. 
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id. Robins notes that there are third-party sites which allow users to exchange virtual 
items for real currency. Id. 
 30.  Eric ‘Xenon’ Yu, The Start Of It All: Skin Gambling, UNIKRN (July 15, 2016), 
https://unikrn.com/news/the-start-of-it-all/. 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id.  
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prominence the popularity of professional matches also rose.34 The 
amount of money that flowed into the skin betting industry created an 
opportunity for the website OPSkins to operate as a form of foreign 
exchange facilitator.35 OPSkins worked like a variety of other peer to 
peer merchants using PayPal to facilitate the delivery of useable real-
world currency to sellers upon completion of a transaction.36 The 
facilitation of a reliable means of extracting useable currency for skins 
led opportunists to create a variety of additional gambling 
opportunities for holders of skins, including casino style gambling 
replete with roulette, poker, dice rolling, and coin flipping, where 
transactions were facilitated almost exclusively in CS:GO skins.37 
Brautigam noted that the August 2013 release of weapons skins 
was quickly followed by the rise of a potentially illicit gambling 
market.38 Brautigram found that the launch of CS:GO weapons skins 
and the blossoming gambling market correlated to a three-fold rise in 
professional tournament prize money, a doubling of the number of 
tournaments, and an additional $1,000 in average per professional 
player monthly earnings.39 Silverman noted that the CS:GO gambling 
industry was valued at $7.4 billion in July 2016, but future valuations 
were uncertain following efforts by Valve to crack down on gambling 
sites after the initiation of two class action lawsuits.40 
II. MCLEOD AND REED LAWSUITS 
Michael McLeod was the first to bring suit against CS:GO game 
developer Valve, filing his complaint in the District of Connecticut on 
June 23, 2016.41 The amended complaint alleged that Valve 
“knowingly allowed, supported, and/or sponsored illegal gambling,” 
 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Yu, supra note 30.  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Thiemo Brautigam, Valve’s Skin Gambling Ban and How It Affects the eSports 
Industry, ESPORTS OBSERVER (July 15, 2016), http://esportsobserver.com/valves-skin-
gambling-ban-and-how-it-affects-the-esports-industry/. 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Robert Silverman, Video Game Gambling Just Took A Huge Hit, VOCATIV (July 14, 
2016, 12:23 PM), http://www.vocativ.com/340492/video-game-gambling-just-took-a-huge-
hit/. 
 41.  Class Action Compl.. McLeod, et al v. Valve Corporation, (D.Ct. filed June 23, 2016) 
(3:16-cv-01018-AWT), 2016 WL 3449545 (D.Conn.) On June 28, McLeod filed an Amended 
Class Action Compl., McLeod v. Valve Corporation, (D.Ct. filed June 28, 2016) (3:16-cv-
01018-AWT). 
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by enabling user accounts to be linked to gambling websites.42 McLeod 
argued that because Valve creates the skins, the company has the 
ability to control the value of skins, but unlike the traditional model of 
a casino there is no cost to Valve.43 McLeod alleges that Valve is aware 
that a portion of its consumers are minors, including himself, and by 
virtue of being under eighteen years old he lacked capacity to enter 
into a contract thereby voiding Valve’s arbitration clause.44 McLeod 
sought restitution by virtue of a Connecticut statute that “renders all 
contracts for gambling null and void.”45 McLeod’s second contractual 
claim asserted the defendants have unjustly enriched and should be 
disgorged of their profits.46 The third count in McLeod’s complaint 
alleged violation of the Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations statute.47 The final count of the complaint alleged that 
the defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices under 
Connecticut law.48  
A second lawsuit against Valve was filed by Jayme Reed in New 
Jersey District Court on July 7, 2016.49 Reed alleged that, as a minor, 
Valve’s arbitration agreement is non-binding allowing him to proceed 
in federal court.50 The first four counts of Reed’s complaint were the 
New Jersey equivalents of McLeod’s allegations; however, Reed 
added two additional counts both labelled Count V and a related count 
labelled VI.51 The first Count V in the Reed complaint alleged that it 
was unlawful to receive “income derived, directly or indirectly, from 
a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful 
debt…”52 The two additional claims advanced by Reed had origins in 
 
 42.  Id. at 2. 
 43.  Id. at 3. 
 44.  Id. at 23-24. Mandatory arbitration clauses and clauses prohibiting the initiation of 
class actions were upheld in American Express et al. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, and have 
been viewed as potential barriers to litigation in the daily fantasy sports realm. 133 S.Ct. 2304 
(2013);  see Alison Frankel, Can Fantasy Sports Players Evade Arbitration in Case v. 
FanDuel, DraftKings?, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2015/10/09/can-fantasy-sports-players-evade-arbitration-in-case-v-fanduel-
draftkings/. 
 45.  Id. at 28 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-553). 
 46.  Id. at 29-30. 
 47.  Id. at 30. 
 48.  Id. at 39 (citing Ct. Gen. Stat §§ 42-110A-42110B). 
 49.  See Class Action Complaint Reed v. Valve Corp., (D. N.J. filed July 7, 2016) (2:16-
cv-04099-ES-JAD), 2016 WL 3672054 (D.N.J.). 
 50.  Id. at 31. 
 51.  Id. at 49, 51—2. It appears as though the Complaint erroneously labeled two counts 
as V. 
 52.  Id. at 49 citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-1. 
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New Jersey consumer protection statutes.53 On the same day Reed filed 
his lawsuit, another federal class action (amended) complaint was filed 
in the Southern District of Florida, in which a mother (C.B.) sued 
Valve and others on behalf of her minor son and a related class, 
outlining similar counts to the McLeod and Reed suits.54  
The fourth major lawsuit against Valve was filed on August 4, 
2016 in the Western District of Washington.55 The complaint was filed 
by McLeod, who had originally filed in Connecticut.56 In the complaint 
McLeod compared Valve to a:  
barkeeper who allows illegal gambling operators to set up shop in 
its backroom and sell chips for a fee to customers on their way in, and 
allows another person to cash customers out inside the bar. Valve had 
the power to prevent the gambling operators from setting up shop, 
chose not to stop them and in fact gave them the keys to the 
backroom.57  
In addition to various claims present in the previously filed 
complaints, the Western Washington McLeod complaint alleged 
violations of more than 150 state gambling laws including at least one 
violation from every state.58 The allegations contained within the 
Western Washington complaint argue that Valve was complicit in the 
facilitation of a market place that was devoid of regulation and rampant 
with unfair contests, corruption, and received substantial benefit from 
minors.59 
Morrison observed that “CSGO has a gambling problem.”60 The 
controversy highlighted by the McLeod and Reed lawsuits surrounds 
the less-than transparent skins gambling industry. Morrison noted that 
the legal complexity of skin betting is partially driven by the fact that 
users do not actually own the skins, instead, users are purchasing a 
 
 53.  Id. at 51-55. 
 54.  Amended Class Action Complaint, C.B. v. Valve Corp., (S.D. Fla. Filed July 7, 2016), 
0:16-cv-61561-BB, 2016 WL 3565991. 
 55.  Class Action Complaint, McLeod v. Valve Corp., (W.D. Wash. Filed Aug. 4, 2016) 
2:16-cv-01227-JCC. 
 56.  See Class Action Complaint, supra note 41. 
 57.  See Class Action Complaint, supra note 54, at 8. 
 58.  Id. at 56-60. 
 59.  See generally id. 
 60.  Angus Morrison, Esports Lawyers Dissect CSGO Gambling in Reddit AMA, PC 
GAMER (July 6, 2016), http://www.pcgamer.com/esports-lawyers-dissect-csgo-gambling-in-
reddit-ama/. 
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license to use the skins.61 Bright noted that the relationship between 
Valve and gambling sites is co-dependent.62 The gambling websites 
exist because Valve has built the Application Program Interfaces 
(APIs) in a manner that allows users to grant access to third-parties.63 
Bright noted that the skins in some games provide nothing more than 
a surface level change, not a competitive advantage.64 In the wake of 
the McLeod and Reed lawsuits, Valve sent twenty-three skin gambling 
sites cease and desist letters on or around July 20, 2016.65 The letter 
purportedly stated: 
Dear Sirs: 
Re: Violations of Steam Subscriber Agreement 
We are aware that you are operating one of the 
gambling sites listed below. You are using Steam 
accounts to conduct this business. Your use of Steam is 
subject to the terms of the Steam Subscriber Agreement 
(“SSA”), 
http://store.steampowered.com/subscriber_agreement/. 
Under the SSA Steam and Steam services are licensed 
for personal, non-commercial use only. Your 
commercial use of Steam accounts is unlicensed and in 
violation of the SSA. You should immediately cease 
and desist further use of your Steam accounts for any 
commercial purpose. If you fail to do this within ten 
(10) days Valve will pursue all available remedies 
including without limitation terminating your accounts. 
Karl Quackenbush 
General Counsel, Valve Corp.66 
 
 61.  Id. See also Bryce Blum, Opinion: Can Valve Realign the Ecosystem of Esports 
Gambling? ESPN (July 15, 2016), http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/17078888/valve-
realign-ecosystem-esports-gambling; Bryce Blum, Betting and Esports: The Crossroads, 
UNIKRN (July 5, 2016), https://unikrn.com/news/betting-and-esports-the-crossroads/; Bryce 
Blum, How Gambling Can be Good for Esports, THE DAILY DOT (June 3, 2015, 2:43 PM), 
http://www.dailydot.com/esports/gambling-esports-benefits/. 
 62.  Peter Bright, Valve Can’t Pass Buck to Third Parties for Teaching CS:GO Kids to 
Gamble, ARS TECHNICA (July 12, 2016, 12:20 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/gaming/2016/07/valve-cant-pass-buck-to-third-parties-for-teaching-
csgo-kids-to-gamble/. 
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Chris Grove, 23 Skin Gambling Sites, Spanning Casino and Sports Betting, Targeted 
with Cease and Desist From Valve, ESPORTS BETTING REP. (July 19, 2016, 9:14 PM), 
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/valve-skin-betting-cease-desist/. 
 66.  Id. 
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Grove noted that the cease and desist letter was sent to most of 
the prominent skin betting companies across a variety of skin betting 
types.67 Several days after Valve sent the cease and desist letter, the 
industry website eSports Betting Report noted that while some 
gambling sites announced their intent to comply with the Valve letter’s 
demands, others continued operating as normal, with some 
affirmatively stating that they would continue to operate without 
regard to the Quackenbush letter.68 
Gambling Compliance noted that Valve’s cease and desist letter 
was widely praised by those who see potential in esports growth.69 It 
was noted that the use of gambling sites by minors, as well as 
illegitimate sites had the potential to attract unwanted regulatory 
attention to an industry that is still nascent in North America.70 The 
announcement by Valve, and subsequent cease and desist letters, 
raised a number of questions for the industry.71 The reasons behind the 
willingness of Valve and other companies to distance themselves from 
the ancillary gambling businesses, including the cash-based 
sportsbooks that have arguably added to the company’s profit margins, 
are not clear.72 A story that has emerged from the skin gambling 
crackdown includes reports of individuals losing large sums of money 
and of children who allegedly became addicted to skin gambling 
sites.73 
 
 67.  Id. (noting that there had been speculation that Valve may specifically target a type 
of betting operator (e.g. casino style or peer-to-peer), but that speculation was unfounded). 
 68.  Will Green, How The 23 Named Skin Gambling Sites Have Reacted to Valve’s Cease 
And Desist Letter, ESPORTS BETTING REP. (July 22, 2016, 8:01 AM), 
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/skin-gambling-sites-status-valve-cease-and-desist/. 
 69.  See David Altaner & Chris Sieroty, Skins-Betting Crackdown Cheers Legitimate E-
Sports Operators, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (July 22, 2016). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See Dustin Gouker, End of the Skin Betting World As We Know It? Valve Cuts Off 
CS:GO In-Game Wagering, ESPORTS BETTING REP. (July 13, 2016, 2:36 PM), 
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/valve-cuts-off-skin-betting/. 
 72.  Will Green, Seven Questions Raised by Valve’s Skin Betting Announcement, LEGAL 
SPORTS REP. (July 16, 2016, 7:34 AM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/10739/valve-skin-
betting-unregulated-esports-gambling-announcement-questions/. 
 73.  Colin Campbell, The True Cost of Counter-Strike Skin Gambling, POLYGON (July 18, 
2016), http://www.polygon.com/features/2016/7/18/12203534/counter-strike-cs-go-skin-
gambling, (stating that the early reports of gambling by youth, and addiction have featured 
prominently in numerous other debates surrounding online gambling); see also Internet 
Gambling Prohibition Act of 2006 Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security, of the H. Judiciary Comm. on H.R. 4777, 110 Cong. (Apr. 5, 2006), 
(noting that Representative McCollum, in a 1998 internet gambling hearing, when discussing 
the level of skill required to be successful at fantasy sports and explaining to the hearing that 
he is familiar with fantasy sports, stated: “my kids do that with little games they plug into the 
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The question of what happens to the esports betting market 
following the cease and desist letters sent by Valve is one that remains 
unanswered. Grove noted that the answer may be contingent on how 
serious Valve is with enforcing their prohibition, noting that “[a]s long 
as items can be moved from one account to another, the potential for a 
gambling product enabled by that transferability remains intact.”74 
Grove also observed that the shutdown of gambling sites may not be 
orderly and some sites may not refund, or allow players the ability to 
liquidate their accounts potentially adding to the possibility that 
regulators may become involved.75 Perhaps the one given, as noted by 
Grove and proven by the prohibition on sports betting, is that 
restrictions and proclamations against gambling do little to deter those 
who enjoy the activity.76  
III. THE INDUSTRY SCANDALS 
Valve’s crackdown on skin gambling sites came in the wake of 
revelations that two professional players had been linked to a skin 
 
video machines.”) See Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997, Hearing on H.R. 2380 
before the subcomm. on Crime of the H. Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (Comments of 
Rep. Bill McCollum) at 116. Former NFL player Reggie Williams testified to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in 1990 that if sports gambling were legalized children would collect 
lottery tickets instead of baseball cards. See also Legis. Prohibiting State Lotteries from 
Misappropriating Professional Sports Service Marks, Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1772, 101st Cong. 
(1990) (Statement of Reggie Williams) at 24.  
 74.  See Chris Grove, Where ESports Betting Goes Following Valve’s Crackdown On 
Skin Gambling, ESPORTS BETTING REP. (July 14, 2016, 12:32PM), 
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/valve-skin-gambling-crackdown-analysis/.  See also 
Will Green, How One Esports Gambling Site Still Offers Skin Betting Despite Order to Stop, 
ESPORTS BETTING REP. (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/csgofast-
eludes-skin-betting-
crackdown/?utm_content=buffer625c3&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&ut
m_campaign=buffer (noting that more than one month after the Valve cease and desist letter 
of July 19, 2016 at least one site was still offering skin betting). 
 75.  Id. 
        76.  Id.  See also Nat’l Gambling Impact Study Comm’n, Gambling In The United States, 
2-14 (1999), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/ngisc-
frr.pdfhttp://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/ngisc-frr.pdf (stating that the 1999 
Commission’s recommendations included a somewhat prophetic note on gambling 
“…brought about by… greater accessibility, technological advances and increasingly 
sophisticated games…” The recommendations encouraged research that “… would examine 
not only the general population, but also sizable subgroups such as youth, women, the elderly 
and minority gamblers…”).  See also Complaint, British Telecomms. PLC v. Valve Corp., 
No. 1:11-CV-01249 (D. Del. July 28, 2016) (Valve has also been sued by British 
Telecommunications (“BT”), who are represented by law firm Proskauer Rose, which has also 
represented nearly every major American professional sports league. The BT complaint 
alleged that various features of Valve’s steam platform infringe on BT patents).   
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gambling site.77 One of the lawyers suing Valve posited that Valve is 
complicit in the growth of the gambling market by virtue of their 
development of API that can be accessed by third-party sites.78 The 
link between professional players and gambling sites may have been a 
tipping point, however, as several other problems with esports were 
identified by an Electronic Arts executive who noted that match-fixing 
and the use of performance enhancing drugs are problems that are 
present in the industry.79 
The relationship between CS:GO professionals and gambling 
sites gained scrutiny when it was revealed that Moe Assad, a 
professional in a contract with the gambling site CSGO Diamonds, had 
received proprietary information in order to maximize the suspense for 
his online streaming.80 Both Assad and CSGO Diamonds 
acknowledged that Assad was provided with secret information that 
according to Assad provided him with an advantage in CSGO 
Diamonds dice roll games.81 The relationship soured publicly and it 
was reported that Assad received the equivalent of $112,000 in 
severance.82 While the Assad case may appear to be an outlier, there 
have been various other reports of fixing actual CS:GO games and 
skins-fueled online casinos.83 
 
 77.  Rich McCormick, Valve Cracks Down on Gambling Sites After Accusations of 
Profiteering, THE VERGE (July 14, 2016, 3:18 AM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2016/7/14/12186584/valve-gambling-statement-counter-strike. 
 78.  Brian Crecente, Lawyer: Valve’s Silence While Helping Gambling Sites is 
‘Unconscionable.’, POLYGON (July 6, 2016, 3:15 PM), 
http://www.polygon.com/2016/7/6/12109022/valve-csgo-lawsuit-interview. 
 79.  Darryn Bonthuys, EA’s Peter Moore talks Match-Fixing, Drugs and Diversity in 
ESports, LAZYGAMER.NET (July 4, 2016), http://www.lazygamer.net/esports/eas-peter-moore-
talks-match-fixing-drugs-diversity-esports/. 
 80.  Charlie Hall, How One Pro CS:GO Player Profited from Gambling, and How It All 
Went Terribly Wrong, POLYGON (July 14, 2016, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.polygon.com/2016/7/14/12188372/how-one-professional-csgo-player-profited-
from-gambling-and-how-it-all-went-terribly-wrong. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  See Yu supra note 30 (stating that “Throws” are referred to as the act of intentionally 
losing a match, a means for some professionals to receive additional compensation. Yu noted 
that following a scandal involving a prominent professional esports team, iBUYPOWER, 
throwing was prohibited; however, the practice is allegedly still common with online forums 
acting as the location for organizing “throws.”). See also Richard Lewis, New Evidence Points 
to Match-Fixing at Highest Level of American Counter-Strike, THE DAILY DOT (Jan. 16, 2015 
5:03PM), http://www.dailydot.com/esports/match-fixing-counter-strike-ibuypower-netcode-
guides/.  See generally William K. Black, The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One 
(University of Texas Press, 2005). William Black therein posits that manipulation is the key 
skill of a “control fraud,” a company a criminal utilizes as protection and shielding illegal 
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An additional controversy emerged when esports personality 
James “PhantomL0rd” Varga did not disclose his ownership of the 
gambling site CS:GO Shuffle.84 The investigation into Varga revealed 
that he had requested the website programmer to increase the 
percentage of dice rolls that he would win on his site.85 Barlowe noted 
that the Varga scandal came less than a month after two other players 
were noted as failing to disclose their ownership of the site CSGO 
Lotto.86 The scandals may have prompted the cease and desist letters 
from Valve; however, given the unregulated nature of the skin 
gambling market, it is possible that the Assad and Varga scandals are 
simply the surface of the underbelly of the marketplace. 
Grove and Krejcik categorized three prominent types of esports 
gambling products: sportsbook wagering, fantasy esports, and 
wagering utilizing in-game items.87 Sportsbook style wagering is 
similar to traditional conceptualizations of sports betting, though 
sportsbooks feature predominantly against the house Las Vegas style 
wagering versus the popular peer-to-peer wagering on sites such as 
Betfair.88 Eilers estimated that in 2015 greater than 60% of sportsbook 
wagering took place in Asian markets.89 Daily fantasy esports are 
offered by both esports specific operators, Vulcan and AlphaDraft, as 
well as a variety of mid-level companies in the daily fantasy sports 
space.90 The daily fantasy esports market is substantially concentrated 
in North America, with an estimated 84 percent of revenue originating 
from Canada and the United States in 2015.91 While both esports 
sportsbook wagering and daily fantasy esports are closely associated 
with popular forms of sports gambling, the third category of esports 
 
action. This manipulation is inherent in complex systems such as banking and financial 
transactions, particularly when control frauds gain political power and influence efforts to 
regulate, collect data, and investigate corruption, As per the classic contemporary example of 
industry (and regulatory) inaction leading to corruption, the post-2008 financial crisis, one 
readily observes how a key industry influence in the form of a first-mover (Salomon Brothers, 
Bear Stearns,) maintaining its competitive advantage through integration (bonds-securities, 
derivatives/CDOs, here: skins gaming/trading) and eventual defensive inaction, may indulge 
in the institutionalization of corrupt practice due to profit margins growth. 
 84.  Katie Barlowe, Skins-Betting Rocked by New Controversy, Rigged Games Alleged, 
CASINO.ORG (July 19, 2016), https://www.casino.org/news/skin-betting-rocked-new-
controversy-rigged-games-alleged. 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id.  
 87.  See Grove & Krejcik, supra note 7. 
 88.  Id. at 7. 
 89.  Id. at 8. 
 90.  Id. at 9. 
 91.  Id. at 11. 
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wagering bears little resemblance to the other two. Wagering using in-
game items as currency is the largest segment of the esports wagering 
market with an estimated handle of $2.28 billion in 2015.92 The largest 
segment of esports betting is primarily confined to the games CS:GO 
and DOTA 2 due to in-game APIs that allow players to transfer items 
in marketplaces external to the games themselves.93 In addition to these 
three means of wagering, certain sites also offer the ability for two 
players to play against one another for money in addition to social 
esports gambling and private bookmaking operations.94 
Within the third realm of esports wagering, skin-betting is a 
virtual cornucopia of nearly every available form of gambling.95 Grove 
notes that skins can be thought of like casino chips.96 When users 
deposit a skin they receive site credits that enable them to participate 
in a variety of gambling contests including: sports betting, virtual coin 
flips, virtual dice rolls, roulette and other casino style games.97 If the 
users win, they are typically paid in skins with which they can either 
continue gambling, attempt to trade on a secondary marketplace, use 
the skins in game, sell for additional credits, or sell for cash through an 
unaffiliated third-party foreign exchange-type site.98 While the virtual 
currency aspect of the skins marketplace may represent a potential 
legal obstacle, in the United States esports wagering legal liability may 
be largely determined by whether esports are considered a sport.99 
The question of whether esports constitute a sport, as a matter of 
law, is more than an esoteric classification exercise.100 The decision to 
term the activity of competitive video game playing “esports” is 
unlikely to be dispositive of a judicial determination as to whether the 
 
 92.  Grove & Krejcik, supra note 7 at 12. 
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Id. at 13. 
 95.  See Chris Grove, Online Betting in the United States, NARUS ADVISORS (May 2016). 
 96.  Chris Grove, Understanding Skin Gambling, NARUS ADVISORS (2016), 
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/A-Guide-To-Skin-
Gambling.pdf. 
 97.  Id. at 7. 
 98.  Id.  
 99.  John T. Holden, et al., The Future is Now: Esports Policy Considerations and 
Potential Litigation, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 46 (2017). 
 100.  James Dator, This Chart Will Always Help You Answer ‘Is It a Sport?,’ SBNATION 
BLOG (Aug. 19, 2014, 8:43 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/lookit/2014/8/19/6044393/is-it-a-
sport-chart-nascar-bowling-ultimate-frisbee, (stating that a 2014 Reddit poll widely circulated 
on the internet reported that of selected responses, boxing was most frequently cited as 
constituting a sport, whereas chess, competitive eating and poker ranked in the bottom three). 
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activities constitute sports.101 Indeed, while the sport moniker in esports 
may draw an association amongst some individuals with baseball, 
basketball or perhaps NASCAR, there are several potential distinct 
disadvantages associated with esports being considered a sport from 
the legal perspective.102 Additionally, the absence of a finding that 
competitive video game playing constitutes a sport could invoke 
additional concerns involving separate regulations.103  
The status of esports as a sport is uncertain. In addition to the 
colloquial uncertainty as to the status of the activity, there is equal 
uncertainty as to which factors determine what classifies an activity as 
a sport.104 While Reddit polls and casual conversations may appear to 
be the extent of the importance of the debate over esports as a sport, 
the classification of the activity may well be determinative of the 
liability facing esports operators in the United States. The following 
section will discuss the growing exposure of esports to various U.S. 
gambling statutes and various international approaches to the 
regulation of esports.105 
 
 101.  See Why Fantasy Sports is Not Gambling, FSTA.ORG, http://fsta.org/research/why-
fantasy-sports-is-not-gambling/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2016), (arguing fervently that the daily 
version of fantasy contests was distinct from sports gambling because it was more similar to 
the season long version of fantasy sports, which were often conceived of as benign. The 
industry proclaimed that daily variety fantasy sports were distinct from gambling, in part 
because of the industry’s compliance with an exemption in the Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act, a law applicable to online payment processors). See also Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5362 (2006), (stating that despite the seemingly 
obscure exemption, a variety of state Attorney Generals concluded that daily fantasy sports 
constituted gambling). See also Dustin Gouker, Attorney General Opinions on Daily Fantasy 
Sports, LEGAL SPORTS REP., http://www.legalsportsreport.com/state-legality-of-dfs/ (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2016). 
 102.  For instance, in the United States various gambling statutes have a specific 
application to sports gambling. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961) (Transmission of Wagering 
Information); 18 U.S.C. § 224 (1964) (Bribery in Sporting Contests); 28 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq. 
(1992) (Professional & Amateur Sports Protection Act). 
 103.  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 509 (1964) (Prohibited Practices in Contests of Knowledge, 
Skill, or Chance). 
 104.  See Biediger v. Quinnipiac, 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating an example of the 
complicated nature of classification of activities as sports). 
 105.  Compare Ryan Rodenberg, Daily Fantasy Sports State-by-State Tracker, ESPN: 
CHALK (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/14799449/daily-fantasy-dfs-
legalization-tracker-all-50-states (stating that in the United States, esports may face challenges 
similar to those of daily fantasy sports operators. The daily fantasy industry undertook a 
meteoric rise in popular press, touting its product as a skill-based game distinct from traditional 
bookmaker sports-betting. The industry even cited Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement 
Act of 2006 (UIGEA) as providing evidence that fantasy sports were recognized as widely 
legal. However, overlooked or ignored, was the fact that UIGEA does not modify any existing 
state or federal law. See 31 U.S.C. § 5361(b) (2006). The failure to recognize that state gaming 
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IV. RELEVANT U.S. STATUTES 
The issue of whether esports are a sport is important because a 
variety of statutes have special applicability to sport. In the event that 
esports are deemed a sport, then sport-specific federal statutes such as 
the Wire Act and Sports Bribery Act are potential threats to the 
continued growth of the esports gambling market.106 A finding that 
esports do not constitute a sport may raise separate concerns for 
operators and participants, including the potential applicability of the 
federal “Quiz Show Scandal” statute.107 In addition, there is a variety 
of other federal and state statutes that pose potentially serious threats 
to both the skin-betting market and the real-money esports betting 
market.108 
The Wire Act applies to those individuals “engaged in the 
business of betting or wagering.”109 Passed in 1961, the Wire Act was 
a key component of the Department of Justice’s war on organized 
crime.110 The statute was prefaced as providing an added tool for 
combatting the interstate nature of organized crime’s bookmaking 
business that relied on the racing wire service to obtain fast reliable 
information about horse racing results and sports scores.111 The Wire 
Act specifically targets those entities operating gambling businesses 
whereby the transmission of gambling information takes place 
between inter-state jurisdictions where the gambling activity is not 
permissible in one or both locations.112 While the Wire Act appears to 
 
laws would likely be determinative of whether daily fantasy sports were legal has essentially 
left daily fantasy operators to fight legislators on an individual state by state basis); with Daily 
Fantasy Sports in 2015: The Rise and the October Fall, OnlineGambling.com (Dec. 29, 2015), 
http://www.onlinegambling.com/news/2015/12/daily-fantasy-sports-in-2015-the-rise-and-
the-october-fall/; and Don Van Natta Jr., Welcome to the Big Time, ESPN (Aug. 24, 2016), 
http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/17374929/otl-investigates-implosion-daily-
fantasy-sports-leaders-draftkings-fanduel.  
 106.  See, e.g., Transmission of Wagering Information, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961). See also 
Bribery in Sporting Contests, 18 U.S.C. § 224 (1964). 
 107.  See Prohibited Practices in Contests of Knowledge, Skill, or Chance, 47 U.S.C. § 509 
(1964). 
 108.  See, e.g., Prohibition of Illegal Gambling Businesses, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970); see 
also e.g. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701 – 3704 (1992). 
 109.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961); see also Ben J. Hayes & Matthew J. Conigliaro, “The 
Business of Betting or Wagering”: A Unifying View of Federal Gaming Law, 57 DRAKE L. 
REV. 445 (2008); see also DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMBLING PROHIBITION 
AND THE INTERNET, University of Nevada Press 4 (2005). 
 110.  See Hayes & Conigliaro supra note 108. 
 111.  See Racing Wire Service, 5 STAN. L. REV. 493 (1953); see also Schwartz supra note 
108. 
 112.  Mark D. Lynch, Smart Money is on Prosecutions: Using the Federal Interstate Wire 
Act to Prosecute Offshore Telephone Gambling Services, 10 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 177 
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encapsulate a broad range of activities beyond the casual bettor, the 
statute has been found to only apply to “sporting event[s] or 
contest[s].”113 Both the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Justice 
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel concluded that in order for the 
statute to be implicated, the infringing activity must involve an 
underlying sporting event.114 In the event that esports are viewed by a 
court as possessing the attributes of a “sporting event or contest,” then 
gambling site operators and those who assist gambling site operators 
may be liable under the Wire Act. 
The Sports Bribery Act was necessitated by a growing number of 
match-fixing scandals in the United States beginning with the 1919 
World Series and perhaps culminating in 1951 when five scandals 
rocked college basketball.115 The Sports Bribery Act has laid largely 
dormant since its passage in 1964, with few high profile 
prosecutions.116 While the statute has been used sparingly by federal 
prosecutors, if esports were found to constitute a sport, instances of 
coordinated bribery-fueled match-fixing could invoke the statute.117 
 
(1999). Section 1084(a) of the Wire Act states:  
  “Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses 
a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign 
commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or 
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire 
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result 
of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”  
Transmission of Wagering Information, 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1961). 
 113.  See In re Mastercard Intern. Inc., 313 F. 3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002); see additionally 
VIRGINIA A. SEITZ,  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., WHETHER PROPOSALS BY ILLINOIS AND NEW YORK TO 
USE THE INTERNET AND OUT-OF-STATE TRANSACTION PROCESSORS TO SELL LOTTERY TICKETS 
TO IN-STATE ADULTS VIOLATES THE WIRE ACT (Sep. 20, 2011). 
 114.  See id. 
 115.  See John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, The Sports Bribery Act: A Law and 
Economics Approach, 42 NKU L. REV. 453 (2015).; see also Ante Udovicic, Sports and 
Gambling A Good Mix? Don’t Bet on It, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 401, 424 (1998). 
 116.  See Holden & Rodenberg supra note 115. Arguably the highest profile prosecution 
under the statute involved James “Jimmy” Burke, who was convicted on testimony of Henry 
Hill and portrayed by Robert DeNiro as Jimmy Conway in the 1990 film Goodfellas. See U.S. 
v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983); see also U.S. v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983); see 
also Henry Hill & Douglas Looney, How I Put the Fix In, Sports Illustrated, Feb. 16, 1981. 
 117.  Section (a) of the Sports Bribery Act states:  
“Whoever carries into effect, attempts to carry into effect, or conspires with any 
other person to carry into effect any scheme in commerce to influence, in any 
way, by bribery any sporting contest, with knowledge that the purpose of such 
scheme is to influence by bribery that contest, shall be fined under this title, or 
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”  
18 U.S.C. § 224 (1964). 
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Although the statute is limited to instances of bribery, it is possible 
quid pro quo style orchestrated fixes, such as that involving the 
purported iBUYPOWER fix, would be sufficient to invoke the 
statute.118 Next to the federal Sports Bribery Act, a variety of state level 
match-fixing statutes could potentially be invoked depending on the 
particular fact pattern of a fixed match. 
In addition to the Wire Act and the Sports Bribery Act, should 
esports be considered a sport, esports gambling operators may need to 
be concerned about the potential threats brought under the Professional 
and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) of 1992.119 The statute 
has been the subject of litigation a limited number of times, and most 
recently has involved the five major American sports entities suing 
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie.120 The statute has questionable 
constitutional underpinnings; however, to date, no court has held that 
the statute violates the Constitution.121  PASPA grants parallel 
authority to certain sports organizations and the Department of Justice 
to stop the spread of state-sanctioned sports gambling.122 PASPA has 
been called a paradox because it seemingly constrains states from 
taking sensible steps to protect consumers.123 If esports are a sport, 
there could be additional industry complications in navigating and 
existing within the confines of PASPA. 
If esports are outside the traditional legal definition for sport, the 
so-called Quiz Show scandal statute could apply to esports 
broadcasting.124  Formally labeled “Prohibited Practices in Contests of 
 
 118.  See Augranzeb Durrani, Match-fixing comes to the World of E-Sports, TECHCRUNCH 
(Apr. 23, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/23/match-fixing-comes-to-the-world-of-e-
sports/. 
 119.  See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (1992). 
 120.  See NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 82 
U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S. June 23, 2014) (No. 13-967); see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n et 
al. v. Christie, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc); see also Governor Christoper J. Christie 
et al. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 16-476, 16-477 (cert. granted Jun 27, 2017). 
 121.  See Ryan M. Rodenberg et al., ‘Whose’ Game is It? Sports Wagering and Intellectual 
Property, 60 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2014); see also Anastasios Kaburakis et al, Inevitable: Sports 
Gambling, State Regulation, and the Pursuit of Revenue, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. Online 27 
(2015); see also John T. Holden et al., Sports Gambling Regulation and Your Grandfather 
(Clause), 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1 (2014); see also Ryan M. Rodenberg & John 
T. Holden, Sports Betting Has An Equal Sovereignty Problem, 67 DUKE L. J. ONLINE 1 (2017) 
 122.  See 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (1992). 
 123.  See Daily Fantasy Sports: Issues and Perspectives: Hearing Before the H. S. Comm. 
On Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, 114th Cong. (2016) (written statement of Ryan M. 
Rodenberg). 
 124.  For a non-legal discussion of esports broadcasting, see Jesse C. Sell, E-Sports 
Broadcasting (June 2015) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
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Knowledge, Skill, or Chance,”125 the federal statute was passed in the 
wake of widespread fraud and deceit in several television “quiz show” 
competitions dating back to the 1950s.126  As applied to any contest of 
“knowledge, skill, or chance, the statute makes it unlawful: 
for any person, with intent to deceive the listening or 
viewing public— 
(1) To supply to any contestant in a purportedly bona 
fide contest of intellectual knowledge or intellectual 
skill any special and secret assistance whereby the 
outcome of such contest will be in whole or in part 
prearranged or predetermined. 
(2) By means of persuasion, bribery, intimidation, or 
otherwise, to induce or cause any contestant in a 
purportedly bona fide contest of intellectual knowledge 
or intellectual skill to refrain in any manner from using 
or displaying his knowledge or skill in such contest, 
whereby the outcome thereof will be in whole or in part 
prearranged or predetermined. 
(3) To engage in any artifice or scheme for the purpose 
of prearranging or predetermining in whole or in part 
the outcome of a purportedly bona fide contest of 
intellectual knowledge, intellectual skill, or chance.127 
Esports are broadcast in two primary ways.  First, traditional 
networks such as ESPN or TBS have shown competitive video 
gaming.  Second, self-streaming platforms such as Twitch or YouTube 
are hubs for esports viewers.  The first category of esports broadcasting 
almost certainly falls within the purview of the Quiz Show scandal 
statute.  The second category is less certain.  Nevertheless, as esports 
moves into mainstream media, incidents involving manipulation and 
fraud that deceive viewers could be prosecuted under a statute 
originally passed to regulate television shows six decades ago. 
The Illegal Gambling Businesses Act of 1970 (IGBA) poses a 
 
Technology)(on file with Comparative Media Studies, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology).   
 125.  47 U.S.C. §509 (1964).  See also, Michael Larkey, Cooperative Play: Anticipating 
the Problem of Copyright Infringement in the New Business of Live Video Game Webcasts, 13 
RUTGERS J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2015). 
 126.  For a detailed discussion of the statute’s origins, see Kimberlianne Podlas, Primetime 
Crimes: Are Reality Television Programs “Illegal Contests” in Violation of Federal Law, 25 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 141, 141–72 (2007). 
 127.  47 U.S.C. § 509 (2012). 
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potential threat to operators who meet three primary requirements: (i) 
a predicate violation of state law; (ii) five or more people involved in 
the operation of the business; (iii) and the business has operated on 
“substantially continuous” basis for 30 days or has $2,000 in gross 
revenue in a single day.128 The purpose of the statute was to supplement 
the resources of state law enforcement, who may have faced 
jurisdictional challenges in stopping large-scale gambling 
operations.129 The broad liberties granted under the IGBA to the 
Department of Justice allow the department to select the state in which 
to prosecute; this would potentially allow prosecutors to select a 
jurisdiction such as Washington State with very strict anti-gambling 
laws as a venue to target a skin or real-money betting site that has not 
excluded participation by residents of the state.130 The IGBA may 
provide the federal government with a powerful tool to take action in 
a jurisdiction with favorable laws if esports betting companies are not 
careful to restrict access to customers in non-permissive states.  
In addition to the IGBA, the Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA) may present concerns for esports 
gambling sites and their payment processors.131 UIGEA prohibits 
payment processors from facilitating payments to online wagering 
companies.132 While the statute has most recently been the focus of 
attention because it contains a limited exemption for certain fantasy 
sports contests, it is unlikely that the exemption would apply to the 
types of activities taking place in the majority of the skin casinos and 
skin and real currency esports sportsbooks.133 It was reported that 
 
 128.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2012). 
 129.  See Kaitlyn Dunphy, Following Suit with the Second Circuit: Defining Gambling in 
the Illegal Gambling Business Act, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1295, 1310 (2014). 
 130.  States have varying laws, governing the definition of gambling, ranging from 
permissive to heavily restricted. The number of states recently analyzing their gambling 
definitions has increased with the growth of the daily fantasy sports industry, whose meteoric 
rise may be a cautionary tale for the emerging North American esports gambling market. See 
Dustin Gouker, Attorney General Opinions on Daily Fantasy Sports, LEGAL SPORTS REP. 
(2016), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/state-legality-of-dfs/. 
 131.  See 31 U.S.C. § 5361 et seq. (2012). 
 132.  Id.  
 133.  The carve out in UIGEA for fantasy sports requires: (ix) participation in any fantasy 
or simulation sports game or educational game or contest in which (if the game or contest 
involves a team or teams) no fantasy or simulation sports team is based on the current 
membership of an actual team that is a member of an amateur or professional sports 
organization (as those terms are defined in section 3701 of title 28) and that meets the 
following conditions: 
(I) All prizes and awards offered to winning participants are established and 
made known to the participants in advance of the game or contest and their value 
is not determined by the number of participants or the amount of any fees paid 
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PayPal instituted a policy that requires various esports tournament 
operators to confirm that they are not operating as gambling sites; the 
result has allegedly been a number of operators switching their 
payment processing provider.134 The greatest threat that UIGEA likely 
poses to esports gambling companies is the potential for payment 
processors to withdraw their services thereby crippling the industry as 
customers are unable to deposit or withdraw funds. 
While federal gambling statutes appear to pose a specific threat 
to various esports gambling providers, a variety of other statutes may 
cause operators to be wary. There is the possibility that certain esports 
gambling ventures may be violating provisions of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform Act that prohibits the listing of certain event 
contracts, which constitute gaming or are contrary to the public 
interest.135 While there is limited case law on prohibited event 
contracts, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
previously found that binary contracts on the outcomes of elections 
would offend the statute.136 Additionally, statutes such as the federal 
mail and wire fraud statutes are expansive and potentially criminalize 
a wide variety of activities by virtue of some form of impropriety.137 
 
by those participants. 
(II) All winning outcomes reflect the relative knowledge and skill of the 
participants and are determined predominantly by accumulated statistical results 
of the performance of individuals (athletes in the case of sports events) in 
multiple real-world sporting or other events. 
(III) No winning outcome is based— 
(aa) on the score, point-spread, or any performance or performances of any single 
real-world team or any combination of such teams; or 
(bb) solely on any single performance of an individual athlete in any single real-
world sporting or other event. 
31 U.S.C. § 5362 (1)(E)(ix) (2012). 
 134.  See Dustin Steiner, Paypal Lays Down the Law on ESports Payments, PVPLIVE (July 
29, 2016), https://pvplive.net/c/paypal-lays-down-the-law-on-esports-payments. The daily 
fantasy industry faced a challenge when payment processor Vantiv withdrew from processing 
daily fantasy transactions following a growing list of states that viewed the activity as 
constituting illegal gambling. See Joe Drape, Payment Processor to Stop Working with Daily 
Fantasy Sports Clients, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/30/sports/draftkings-fanduel-vantiv-daily-fantasy.html. 
 135.  See Order Prohibiting the Listing or Trading of Political Event Contracts, Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n, (Apr. 2, 2012), 
http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@rulesandproducts/documents/ifdocs/nadexorder
040212.pdf. 
 136.  Id.  
 137.  For instance, the mail fraud statute states:  
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to 
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, 
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Instances where esports gambling sites have failed to disclose conflicts 
of interest in ownership or manipulate contests could potentially 
invoke the powerful mail and/or wire fraud statutes. 
At the state level, at least two categories of laws could attach in 
the esports betting space.  First, numerous states have anti-bookmaking 
statutes.  For example, Washington State regulators recently enforced 
its bookmaking statute in the case of Betcha.com.138  Like some esports 
betting portals, Betcha.com described itself as a “person to person 
betting platform.”139  In a ruling with broad implications for operators 
with a presence in the Evergreen State, the Washington Supreme Court 
held that: “Because bookmaking alone may constitute professional 
 
alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any 
counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything 
represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious 
article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to 
do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter 
or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or 
causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by 
any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any 
such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier 
according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be 
delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the 
violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized, transported, 
transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, a presidentially 
declared major disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in section 102 
of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 
U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not 
more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012);  
The federal wire fraud statute states:  
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to 
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by 
means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign 
commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of 
executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation occurs in relation to, or involving 
any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid 
in connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as 
those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a financial 
institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned 
not more than 30 years, or both.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).  
 138.  Internet Cmty. & Entm’t Corp. v. Wash. St. Gambling Comm’n, 238 P.3d 1163, 1168 
(Wash. 2010). 
 139.  Id.  
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gambling under the statute, we need not address whether Betcha or its 
users were also engaged in ‘gambling’ as that term is defined.”140 
Second, many states regulate or ban pooled money being used as 
prize money for competitions.  With many esports tournaments 
featuring prize pools in the millions, the source of such pools could 
implicate various state laws.  While nascent esports pools have yet to 
be scrutinized specifically, North Dakota,141 Massachusetts,142 
Florida,143 and Nevada144 have all analyzed the legality of competition 
payouts via prize money pools.        
V. FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS’ ESPORTS LAWS AND POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Internationally, various countries’ regulators have become aware 
of the growth of esports and the emergence of consumer protection 
issues arising out of a lack of oversight.145 Calvin noted that in the 
United Kingdom, both the UK Gambling Commission and the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport have examined the 
industry.146 Indeed, the UK Gambling Commission’s annual report for 
2015/16 noted: “[t]he growing market in esports and computer gaming 
has scope to present issues for regulation and player protection-issues 
which are being examined by gambling regulators in other 
international markets.”147 The UK Gambling Commission’s 
recognition of esports gambling as an emerging gambling product 
represents a substantial proactive step; however, as noted by Wood, 
the UK is presently at the beginning stages of recognizing the potential 
of the esports market.148 Wood further observed that the future 
 
 140.  Id. at 1167. 
 141.  Letter from Heidi Heitkamp, N.D. Att’y Gen., Letter Op. 94-L-298, to Andrew 
Maragos, Rep., H.R. (Nov. 1, 1994). 
 142.  MASS. GAMING COMM’N, White Paper on Daily Fantasy Sports (Jan. 11, 2016). 
 143.  FLA. ATT’Y GEN. OP. 90-58 at 1(July 27,1990); FLA. ATT’Y GEN. OP. 91-03 at 1 (Jan. 
8, 1991); FLA. ATT’Y GEN. OP. 94-72 at 1 (Aug. 23, 1994). 
 144.  NEV. ATT’Y GEN. MEMO., LEGALITY OF DAILY FANTASY SPORTS UNDER NEVADA 
LAW at 1 (Oct. 16, 2015). 
 145.  See Alex Calvin, Does Esports Need Regulation?, THE MKT. FOR COMPUTER & VIDEO 
GAMES (July 29, 2016, 11:57 AM), http://www.mcvuk.com/news/read/does-esports-need-
regulation/0170439. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Sarah Harrison, Annual Report & Financial Statements 2015/16, U.K. GAMBLING 
COMMISSION at 11 (2016),  http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/pdf/Annual-report-and-
accounts-2015-16.pdf. 
 148.  See Joss Wood, UK Gambling Commission: We’ll Work to Minimize Risks from 
Emerging Esports Betting Markets, ESPORTS BETTING REP. (July 19, 2016), 
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regulatory landscape of esports in the UK will likely involve input 
from various private esports operators; however, these groups may 
have competing interests.149 The UK Gambling Commission also 
acknowledged that they had knowledge of skin betting and would take 
action if British players were invited to gamble on licensed sites.150 
While the UK attempts to decide how to regulate esports, France has 
taken steps to create the France esports federation.151 
In November 2015, France took preliminary steps to classify 
esports as a sport.152 As the process is underway for the formal 
recognition of esports under French law, the France esports federation 
was launched as the representative voice of the national esports 
community and as a “partner of the French National Olympic and 
Sports Committee.”153 While the federation appears to provide a voice 
to the French esports community, Auxent noted that the federation 
possesses no power and is essentially a lobbying group.154 Kint and 
Ledure observed that the French regulatory and legal framework needs 
to provide clarity and protect against outside threats.155 Kint and Ledure 
noted that without government clarification esports contests would be 
classified as illegal lotteries under French law.156 In addition to the 
 
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/uk-regulators-address-esports-betting/. 
 149.  Id.  
 150.  See Scott Longley, Skin Betting of Increasing Interest to UK Regulators, Operators, 
and Industry Monitors, ESPORTS BETTING REP. (May 16, 2016), 
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/uk-considers-skin-betting-regulation/. Indeed, the Isle 
of Man, a British Crown dependency, through its Gambling Supervision Commission has 
amended gaming regulations to allow for skin betting. Joss Wood, Good News For Skin 
Betting, As Isle of Man Amends Gaming Regulations to Allow It, ESPORTS BETTING REP (Feb. 
21, 2017), http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/isle-man-amends-gaming-regulations-allow-
skin-betting/. 
 151.  Adrien Auxent, All You Need to Know About France’s New Esports Federation, 
ESPORTS OBSERVER (Apr. 28, 2016), http://esportsobserver.com/need-know-frances-new-
esports-federation-france-esports/. 
 152.  See Adrien Auxent, The French Government Recognizes Esports, but Who Gets to 
Decide What Esports Is?, ESPORTS OBSERVER (Nov. 15, 2015), 
http://esportsobserver.com/the-french-government-recognizes-esports-but-who-gets-to-
decide-what-esports-is/. 
 153.  Auxent supra note 152. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  See Arnaut Kint & Sebastien Ledure, Esports: The French Quest For A Legal 
Framework, WORLD SPORTS L. REP. (July 2016). 
 156.  France applies a strict test for determining whether an activity is a lottery, according 
to Kint and Ledure the test involves: “(i) a public offer, (ii) hope of a gain, (iii) financial 
contribution from players and (iv) presence of an element of hazard.” See id. As described by 
Kint and Ledure, the definition of lottery in France appears to be the equivalent of the “any 
chance” test, which is applied in a minority of U.S. jurisdictions, and is regarded as the most 
stringent test for classifying an activity as not gambling, because even skill-based activities 
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gambling connotation, the authors noted that absent government 
oversight, professional esports players may not receive protections that 
other professional athletes receive.157 The French Ministry of the 
Economy and Finance released a report noting that France is the 
world’s seventh largest esports market.158 The government report 
recommended clarification on the noted lottery issue, in addition to 
protection for children, and appropriate recognition for professional 
players including a visa program to attract international players to 
French competitions.159 
While France and the UK progress towards regulation, the 
country with the most developed esports infrastructure is South Korea, 
regularly broadcasting esports on mainstream television.160 The South 
Korean government formed the Korean Esports Association to oversee 
the industry.161 Jung noted that the government support in South Korea 
for esports coupled with cheap and widely available broadband 
internet have been the two factors most important to the activity’s 
growth in the country.162 The Korean Esports Association is embedded 
within the South Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism and 
has the authority to license and regulate professional gamers, teams, 
and certain businesses that are associated with esports broadcasting.163 
While esports governance is most advanced in South Korea, the state 
gambling monopoly does not offer esports betting, driving the practice 
underground and contributing to the estimated $14-25 billion wagered 
illegally each year.164 
The Canadian province of Quebec, launched an esports betting 
offering for the first time on August 11, 2016 through the provincial 
 
possess some element of chance. Anthony Cabot, et al., Alex Rodriguez, A Monkey, and the 
Game of Scrabble: The Hazard of Using Illogic to Define the Legality of Games of Mixed Skill 
and Chance, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 383, 393 (2008). 
 157.  See Kint & Ledure, supra note 156. 
 158.  See Rudy Sales & Jerome Durain, E-Sport La Practique Competitive Du Jeu Video, 
MINISTERE DE L’ÉCONOMIE, DE L’INDUSTRIE ET DU NUMERIQUE at 2 (Mar. 2016). 
 159.  Id. at 4. 
 160.  See Jorge Albor, Why Korea Is Set to Dominate ‘Overwatch’ Esports, FANDOM (June 
29, 2016), http://fandom.wikia.com/articles/korea-set-dominate-overwatch-esports. 
 161.  See Paul Mozur, For South Korea, E-sports Is National Pastime, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/technology/league-of-legends-south-korea-
epicenter-esports.html?_r=0. 
 162.  See Daniel Jung, Olswang on eSports: Lessons from South Korea, OLSWANG (Mar. 
2, 2016), http://www.olswang.com/articles/2016/03/olswang-on-esports-lessons-from-south-
korea/. 
 163.  Id.  
 164.  Id.  
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lottery Loto-Quebec.165 Lottery administrators noted that there would 
be future offerings on esports, marking an opportunity for Quebec 
residents to gamble in an environment with clear regulation.166 Quebec 
is the home of various online gambling providers, but the move to offer 
esports betting in a regulated market is still progressive for a North 
American market.167 Hincer noted that many of Canada’s gaming laws 
are designed for land-based casinos and they may stifle technological 
advances, while at the same time leaving individuals without sufficient 
protection.168 The move by Quebec, however, comes at a time when a 
Quebec government working group has suggested that all private 
gambling sites should be available only through “a governmental 
website/portal,” which would be the gate keeper allowing only those 
private companies  with appropriately issued licenses to be accessible 
to residents.169  
While countries such as the UK, France, Korea, and Canada 
(Quebec) have begun exploring ways of regulating various 
components of the esports industry and related gambling market, other 
regions are choosing to ban the gambling aspects. For instance, the 
government of South Australia announced its decision to ban esports 
betting, citing concerns about the risk of children becoming addicted 
to the activity.170 A variety of other countries have laws that could 
potentially be implicated in esports betting and/or corruption. For 
example, in China it is a criminal act to organize gambling activity, 
 
 165.  See Joss Wood, Regulated Esports Betting Now Available from Loto-




 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id.  
 168.  See Ilkim Hincer, A World of Change, The Future of Gaming Regulation, CANADIAN 
GAMING LAW. Summer 2016, at 8, 9.   
 169.  See Johnny Jaswal, The Illegality of Current Gambling Laws in Canada and the 
Vince Carter Trade – Views from the 6, CALVIN AYRE (Mar. 14, 2016), 
http://calvinayre.com/2016/03/14/business/the-illegality-of-current-gambling-laws-in-
canada/. For additional discussion of online gambling in Canada see Ryan M. Rodenberg & 
John T. Holden, A Sure Thing? Online Gaming and Canada, 3 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS 
AND ENT. L. F. 98 (2013). 
 170.  See Joss Wood, South Australia Gets Cold Feet About Esports Betting and Bans 
It, ESPORTS BETTING REP. (Aug. 9, 2016, 6:48 AM), 
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/south-australia-prohibits-betting-esports/; see also John 
Rau, New Frontier Against Problem Gambling, News Releases John Rau –Government of S. 
Austl. (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.premier.sa.gov.au/index.php/john-rau-news-releases/970-
new-frontier-against-problem-gambling (noting that “[t]here is very little research on eSports’ 
betting and the potential dangers, especially to children and young people”). 
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which may limit opportunities for individuals to wager.171 Germany has 
relied on fraud statutes to prosecute those suspected of betting-related 
match fixing and could potentially attempt to utilize the same statutes 
to target esports match fixers.172 The classification of esports as a sport 
would potentially implicate sport fraud statutes in the Italian penal 
code that specifically apply to individuals who undertake to 
manipulate a sporting event.173 The Criminal Code of Canada includes 
a provision that prohibits cheating in betting where there is an intent to 
defraud.174 In addition to the noted countries and specific statutory 
provisions that may be applicable to combat corruption in esports, a 
number of other countries rely on various fraud, bribery, and gambling 
statutes that could be potentially implicated in the esports context.175 
VI. VIRTUAL CURRENCY 
Moving forward, an important issue in attempting to determine 
the proper regulatory approach to combating corruption in esports will 
be what sort of treatment courts will afford the skins, which fuel the 
skins gambling industry. While Bitcoin is the most visible and 
prominent form of virtual currency, with transactions exceeding 
$575,000,000 USD on a daily basis, other virtual items such as skins 
are raising additional challenges for a banking and regulatory system 
that is seemingly unprepared for a technological shift.176 The U.S. 
Treasury has defined a virtual currency as “a medium of exchange that 
operates like a currency in some environments, but does not have all 
the attributes of real currency.”177 Amongst the cited benefits of Bitcoin 
and other virtual currencies such as Ether is the anonymity for users, 
which has also likely caused some governments to ban the user-
generated currency.178 Other countries have taken different approaches, 
such as the UK, which stated that Bitcoins are unregulated and subject 
 
 171.  See John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Lone-Wolf Match-Fixing: Global Policy 
Considerations, INT’L J. OF SPORT POL’Y & POL.  1, 6 (2016). 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id; see also Criminal Code of Canada RSC 1985 Sec. 209. 
 175.  See generally Holden & Rodenberg supra note 171. 
 176.  For a background discussion of Bitcoin, see Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, 
Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L REV. 271 (2015). 
 177.  See id. at 277 note 36 (quoting DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT 
NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS 
ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013)). 
 178.  See Tu & Meredith, supra note 176. 
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to value-added taxation.179 
Greebel and others observed: “[r]ather than trying to stifle or 
control virtual currencies, U.S. governmental entities recognize the 
long-term value of virtual currencies and are trying to create a 
regulatory regime to foster growth and development, and an 
atmosphere where institutional and retail investors are protected.”180 
Conversely, Tu and Meredith note that under U.S. federal law virtual 
currency exists in something of a regulatory black hole.181 Two states, 
Kansas and Texas, have issued pronouncements that virtual currencies 
such as Bitcoin have no monetary value.182 A Florida Circuit Court has 
similarly found that Bitcoins do not meet the statutory definitions of 
monetary instrument for a money laundering conviction.183  
Three U.S. federal courts have recently examined cases involving 
virtual items. The first decision was issued by the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Maryland on October 20, 2015.184 In Mason, the court 
ruled that the plaintiff’s virtual losses were not manifested in the real-
world.185 The plaintiff played the mobile game Game of War (GoW). 
In the game, there is a virtual casino where players can pay for spins 
of a virtual wheel game in hopes of winning an in-game prize.186 The 
plaintiff claimed that she lost approximately $100 in the GoW virtual 
casino over the course of a year.187 The court held that by purchasing 
spins of the GoW wheel with virtual gold “the plaintiff was not 
wagering with dollars; she was playing with virtual gold (emphasis in 
original).188 The gold purchased in the gold-store was issued for 
entertainment purposes through a revocable license; however, the 
court noted that while she could spend the gold in game she was not 
 
 179.  Id. at 302. 
 180.  Evan L. Greebel, et al., Recent key Bitcoin and virtual currency regulatory and law 
enforcement developments, 16 J. OF INVESTMENT COMP. 13 (2015). 
 181.  Tu & Meredith, supra note 176 at 306. 
 182.  Id. at 308. Although as noted by Tu and Meredith, in perhaps some form of irony, the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held that Bitcoin is a form of currency, 
and a scheme involving attempts to defraud individuals transacting in Bitcoin was subject to 
the laws of the SEC. See id. at 309 citing SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-00416, 2013 WL 
4028182, at 2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013). 
 183.  See Order Granting Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss the Information, State v. 
Espinoza, No. F14-2923, 6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 22, 2016). 
 184.  See Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 457 (D. Md. 2015). 
 185.  Id. at 459. 
 186.  Id. at 460. 
 187.  Id. at 460. 
 188.  Id. at 465. 
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able to “cash out” in the game.189  
The second virtual currency case originated in the Western 
District of Washington.190 The plaintiff sought recovery under 
Washington’s gambling loss recovery statute for losses suffered in the 
virtual game Big Fish Casino.191 Visitors to the virtual casino can play 
for, or purchase, additional chips to play games at the casino.192 Similar 
to the plaintiff in Mason, the court noted that the plaintiff in Kater did 
not suffer a loss of a “thing of value,” noting that the chips in the casino 
cannot be exchanged for cash or merchandise, and therefore the 
plaintiff’s claim was outside the scope of the Washington gambling 
loss recovery statute.193 The plaintiff further argued that the chips could 
be exchanged on the secondary market for cash and therefore are things 
of value; however, the exchange violated the terms of use associated 
with the game, and the court concluded that allowing a plaintiff to sue 
based on the plaintiff’s own breach of contract “would be contrary to 
basic principles of law and equity.”194 
The third in the examined trilogy of virtual currency cases 
originated in the North District of Illinois.195 The Double Down Casino 
in Phillips operated similarly to the Big Fish Casino in Kater, with 
users being able to play for free with virtual chips in a virtual casino, 
but users also had the ability to purchase additional chips.196 The 
Double Down chips could not be exchanged for cash, nor could they 
be cashed out for physical items.197 While players could cash out their 
chips through an unaffiliated Double Down market, such transfers 
violate the game’s terms of service.198 The court noted that the plaintiff 
was not a loser in the traditional gambling sense, because buying 
virtual chips was only buying the right to continue playing the games, 
 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  See Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., No. C15-612 MJP, 2015 WL 9839755 (W.D. 
Wash. Nov. 19, 2015). 
 191.  Id. at 1. 
 192.  Id. at 1. 
 193.  Id. at 4. 
 194.  Id. at 2, 4. 
 195.  See Phillips v. Double Down Interactive LLC, No. 15 C 04301, 2016 WL 1169522 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2016). 
 196.  Id. at *4. 
 197.  Id. at *5. 
 198.  Id. Interestingly, while not allowing the exchange of virtual currency for physical 
currency, the court notes that Double Down reported revenue of over $280 million in 2014, 
which the court observed appears to be exclusively from the sale of virtual chips, id. at n.4. 
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not a form of a wager.199 It is unclear how or if these three cases would 
apply in the case of skin gambling, where the skin marketplace that 
facilitates the transfer of virtual items is operated by the company who 
manufactures the game.200 In the case of skin wagering, while Steam is 
a subsidiary of Valve and operates the skins’ marketplace, it does not 
operate the third-party skin-to-physical currency exchange.201 
Internationally, there appears to be similar confusion as to what 
status to afford virtual currencies, though the idea of denationalizing 
money is not a new concept.202 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
acknowledges that the historical conceptualization of money, being 
associated with the rights sovereign governments maintain to regulate 
the mediums of exchange within their borders, does not fit with the 
current emergence of virtual currencies.203  The IMF argues that 
presently virtual currencies (VC) do not fulfill “the three economic 
roles associated with money”: “(1) High price volatility of VCs limits 
their ability to serve as a reliable store of value.”204 (2) “The current 
small size and limited acceptance network of VCs significantly 
restricts their use as a medium of exchange.”205 (3) “As of now, there 
is little evidence that VCs are used as an independent unit of 
account.”206 While the three factors cited by the IMF are not presently 
demonstrable in virtual currencies, the market continues to evolve. 
Additionally, the IMF does not bind any country or court; as such, to 
deduce that skins or any other form of virtual currency are not the same 
as physical currency would be ill-advised. 
The question of whether skins constitute currency or are a 
commodity may have different solutions in differing jurisdictions. 
However, in contrast to the virtual casino cases, the Steam marketplace 
seemingly acknowledges that skins may be bought and sold on the 
marketplace, though funds cannot be withdrawn through the Steam 
 
 199.  Id. at *9. 
 200.  See Community Market, STEAM, https://steamcommunity.com/market/ (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2016). 
 201.  See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, SKINEXCHANGE, https://skinxchange.com/ 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2016). 
 202.  See DONG HE ET AL., VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND BEYOND: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS, 
11 (2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf (noting Friedrich 
Hayek proposed denationalizing in the 1970s). 
 203.  Id. at 16. 
 204.  Id. at 17. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. 
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marketplace.207 From a public policy perspective, it is likely 
undesirable to allow a highly regulated practice to flourish in an 
opaque market. However, the challenges with applying real world laws 
to virtual worlds is one that courts are likely going to have to address 
for the foreseeable future.208   
VII. INTEGRITY SCANDALS 
The biggest scandal in esports arguably unfolded in October 
2015, when South Korean investigators arrested twelve people in 
association with five fixed StarCraft 2 matches.209 The scandal 
allegedly allowed the orchestrators to win $37,000 by exploiting the 
illegal betting market through payments to three players.210 While 
 
 207.  See Community Market FAQ, STEAM, 
https://support.steampowered.com/kb_article.php?ref=6088-UDXM-7214 (lasted visited Oct. 
20, 2016). 
 208.  See generally Jon M. Garon, Playing in the Virtual Arena: Avatars, Publicity, and 
Identity Reconceptualized Through Virtual Worlds and Computer Games, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 
465 (2008). Courts have been tasked with addressing virtual disputes since early in the 
development of online gaming. For instance, in the early 2000s a group started a company that 
employed unskilled laborers to sit at computers in Tijuana training and developing virtual 
characters that could later be sold for up to $200. Julian Dibbell, Serfing the Web: Black Snow 
Interactive and the World’s First Virtual Sweat Shop (January 2003), 
http://www.juliandibbell.com/texts/blacksnow.html.  In response, the game operator Mythic 
Entertainment banned the accounts associated with the characters being sold; this launched an 
early discussion as to who is the rightful owner of virtual items.  Id. Professor James 
Grimmelmann noted that the online game Second Life allows users to purchase plots of land, 
which can also be transferred amongst other game participants. James Grimmelmann, Virtual 
World Feudalism, 118 YALE L. J. PKT. PART 126, 126-27 (2009). Virtual property in Second 
Life was the subject of a 2007 lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Bragg v. Linden 
Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596 (E.D. Pa. 2007). The dispute arose when the plaintiff 
acquired virtual land for below the virtual fair market value through what the game maker 
termed an “exploit.” Id. at 597. The game maker subsequently suspended the plaintiff’s 
account who then filed suit.  Id. The parties would subsequently settle prior to a resolution on 
the merits. See Second Life: Settlement in Bragg v. Linden, US LEGAL (Oct. 10, 2007), 
http://blog.uslegal.com/2007/10/10/second-life-settlement-in-bragg-v-linden/. 
 209.  Brendan Sinclair, 12 Arrested in Esports Match Fixing Scandal – Report, 
GAMESINDUSTRY (Oct. 19, 2015, 2:12 PM), http://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2015-10-
19-12-arrested-in-esports-match-fixing-scandal-report. 
 210.  Id. The gambling market is victimized in some match-fixing situations by virtue of 
the fact that the market is theoretically meant to have a price set such that it attracts an equal 
amount of bets (in monetary value) on each side of the wager, allowing the bookmaker to then 
make money off the vigorish (a type of commission). In gambling-related match-fixing 
situations the fixers typically are able to make bets at an attractive market price because the 
odds reflect the bookmaker’s belief that the price is informed by the bookmakers’ expert 
knowledge. Match-fixing creates a situation where the fixer is betting with non-public 
information, or greater knowledge than the bookmaker, and therefore is able to exploit a 
market price that does not reflect all information. For additional information on the structure 
of gambling markets see Steven D. Levitt, Why Are Gambling Markets Organized So 
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match fixing has resulted in some of the most prominent scandals to 
affect esports, the industry has seen its share of growing pains with 
other scandals including sexism, use of banned competitors, doping, 
and agreements to split prize pools.211  
The esports match-fixing scandals are becoming more prominent. 
Durrani reported in April 2016 that twenty-one CS:GO players had 
been accused of being complicit in match fixing dating back to 2015.212 
Durrani observed that match fixing scandals have also rocked the game 
community surrounding DOTA 2, noting that in 2013 a Russian player 
threw a match in order to win a bet of $322; since that time, the number 
322 has become synonymous with match-fixing in the industry.213 
Richmond wrote that the pressures of short careers on esports 
competitors may contribute to a willingness to manipulate the 
outcomes of matches, observing that some esports athletes retire as 
young as nineteen years old, and they have little opportunity to remain 
involved in the activity following the end of their playing careers.214 
While match-fixing scandals involving players have become the focus 
of recent attention, the practice is not confined directly to those 
competing.215 MBC, a Korean esports broadcaster, undertook 
modifying some game maps in the game Warcraft III in order to have 
a more competitive competition.216 The in-game match-fixing scandals 
have been exacerbated by a series of seemingly unbelievable scandals 
in the esports gambling market. 
 
Differently from Financial Markets, 114 ECON. J. 223 (2004). 
 211.  See 5 Biggest Esports Scandals, BETMINDED (2016), http://www.betminded.com/5-
biggest-esports-scandals-27320.html; see also Kevin Loria, Some competitive video gamers 
are abusing drugs to get an edge, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 15, 2016, 3:44 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/esports-doping-scandal-investigated-by-espns-otl-2016-1. 
 212.  Aurangzeb Durrani, Match-Fixing Comes to the World of E-Sports, TECHCRUNCH 
(Apr. 23, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/23/match-fixing-comes-to-the-world-of-e-
sports/. 
 213.  Id.  
 214.  Ben Richmond, When it Comes to Gambling Scandals, Esports Are Just Like Regular 
Sports, VICE MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 28, 2015), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/when-it-
comes-to-gambling-scandals-esports-are-just-like-regular-sports. 
 215.  Callum Leslie, M0E’s Future with Turner’s ELEAGUE in Doubt Amid Gambling 
Scandal, THE DAILY DOT (June 20, 2016, 5:56 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/esports/m0e-
gambling-eleague/. 
 216.  Alex Whiteman, A Short History of Match-Fixing in Esports, ESPORTS BETS (May 
10, 2016), http://www.esportsbets.com/2255/esports-match-fixing-prevalence-history/; see 
also  KidArtica, MBC Map Scandal Update, SK-GAMING (Mar. 2, 2005), http://www.sk-
gaming.com/content/9111-MBC_Map_Scandal_Update; see also MBC Map Scandal, 
TEAMLIQUID, http://wiki.teamliquid.net/warcraft/MBC_Map_Scandal (last modified June 30, 
2016). 
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Examples of recent scandals highlight issues of lack of 
transparency on the part of gambling sites as well as potential conflicts 
of interest. For example, CS:GO player “MoE” was sponsored by 
casino style skin-betting site CS:GO Diamonds, and in exchange for 
compensation, MoE would broadcast his gambling on the site. In a 
related scandal, CS:GO Lotto, became embroiled in a scandal when it 
was revealed that two popular esports professionals had an equity stake 
in the site, which was not revealed in videos showing the players 
winning on the site.217 These gambling sites lacked transparency and 
expanded the scope of likely conflicts of interest within the industry.218  
While corruption has plagued both the esports games themselves 
and the integrity of the gambling market, the lack of central 
governance may be condoning the use of performance enhancing 
drugs. In January 2016, ESPN Outside the Lines ran a feature on the 
doping problem currently emerging in esports.219 The drugs of choice 
in esports are nootropics, or drugs designed to boost cognitive 
function.220 Professional CS:GO player Kory “Semphis” Friesen was 
quoted as saying “we are all on Adderall.”221 The doping scandal led to 
esports league ESL implementing random drug screening of 
competitors.222 ESL noted that it views doping as the equivalent to 
other forms of cheating including match-fixing, and violators of the 
league’s drug policy would receive equivalent punishments to other 
forms of cheating.223 In April 2016, it was noted that no ESL player 
 
 217.  See Leonardo Postrado, Youtube Esports Star Issues Non-Apology Over Skin Betting 
Scandal, CALVIN AYRE (July 7, 2016), http://calvinayre.com/2016/07/07/business/youtube-
esports-star-issues-non-apology-over-skin-betting-scandal/. 
 218.  For a more detailed discussion of the MoE CS:GO Lotto affair see Will Green, Skin 
Gambling Site CSGO Diamonds: We Told Sponsored Player In Advance When He Would Win, 
ESPORTS BETTING REP. (June 13, 2016, 2:23 PM), http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/csgo-
diamonds-skin-betting-m0e/. 
 219.  See Kevin Loria, Some Competitive Video Gamers Are Abusing Drugs To Get An 
Edge, TECHINSIDER (Jan. 15, 2016, 3:44 PM), http://www.techinsider.io/esports-doping-
scandal-investigated-by-espns-otl-2016-1. 
 220.  See Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Cognition Enhancing Drugs 
(‘Nootropics’): Time to Include Coaches and Team Executives in Doping Tests? BRIT. J. OF 
SPORTS MED. (Jan. 25, 2016), http://bjsm.bmj.com/content/early/2016/01/25/bjsports-2015-
095474.full. 
 221.  See Hugh Langley, Sex, Drugs and Counter-Strike: eSports is Fighting its Demons, 
TECHRADAR (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.techradar.com/us/news/gaming/sex-drugs-and-
counter-strike-esports-is-fighting-its-demons-1318109. 
 222.  Evan Lahti, After Drug Scandal, ESL Says “Esports Needs to Mature,” PC GAMER 
(July 24, 2015), http://www.pcgamer.com/after-drug-scandal-esl-says-esports-needs-to-
mature/. 
 223.  Id. See also Rob Crossley, ESL Reveals Plan to Clean Up Doping, Corruption, and 
Cheating in Esports, GAMESPOT (May, 13, 2016), http://www.gamespot.com/articles/esl-
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had yet returned a positive test.224 Langley wrote that amongst the 
strategies to deter doping are contractual morals clauses that would 
allow for termination of an individual caught doping from sponsorship 
and playing contracts.225 While randomized drug testing may catch 
some drug users, given the short time that the drug is detectable in an 
individual’s system, it is likely that advanced doping regimes may be 
able to defeat the testing programs.226  
The corruption scandals facing the esports industry are similar to 
those being faced by other sports. Both doping and match-fixing have 
had a substantial impact on international sport.227 Similarly the 
corruption facing the esports gambling industry is not unprecedented 
nor is the growth of the gambling industry seemingly outpacing the 
industry that supports it.228 The continued success of the esports 
industry will likely require some form of overarching governance 
across various titles capable of representing the interests of the industry 
to various law making bodies. The idea of attempting to continue with 
reactionary responses to scandals previously present in other sports 
would not be viewed favorably by lawmakers, who will likely lack the 
technical expertise to fully appreciate the intricacies of the industry. 
Amongst the challenges with the international regulation and 
governance of esports are several aspects. Firstly, the industry is still 
in growth stages, there are presently a number of national and 
international organizations that are competing for recognition; 
however, to date no all-encompassing organization has emerged in the 
form of Olympic-style governing bodies akin to other more traditional 
 
reveals-plan-to-clean-up-doping-corruption-and/1100-6439781/.   
 224.  See Langley, supra note 221. One of the critiques of various sports drug testing 
programs is that “they were more like discipline tests, IQ tests. If you were careful and paid 
attention, you could dope and be 99 percent certain that you would not get caught.” Henry 
Abbott, The Gaps in NBA Drug Testing, ESPN (Jan. 11, 2013), 
http://www.espn.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/51305/gaps-in-nba-drug-testing. 
 225.  See Langley, supra note 221. 
 226.  The presence of Adderall is estimated to be detectable in saliva (ESL uses oral swabs 
for drug testing) for seventy-two hours. See Adderall and Drug Tests: What Drug Adderall 
Really Comes Up As In A Test, HOME HEALTH TESTING (Mar. 9, 2010), 
http://www.homehealthtesting.com/blog/2010/03/adderall-and-drug-tests-what-drug-
adderall-really-comes-up-as-in-a-test/. See James Pavisian, The Case for Human Ingenuity: 
How Adderall has Sullied the Game, 48 WASHBURN L. J. 175, 205 (2008), for a discussion of 
the benefits and drawbacks of salivary testing. 
 227.  See generally DECLAN HILL, THE INSIDER’S GUIDE TO MATCH-FIXING IN FOOTBALL 
(2014), for a background discussion on the impact of match fixing. 
 228.  See, e.g., Ryan M. Rodenberg & Anastasios Kaburakis, Legal and Corruption Issues 
in Sports Gambling, 23 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 8 (2013). 
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sports.229 Secondly, there is a challenge of attempting to put the 
disruptive technologies of esports into the model that has traditionally 
been used for sports. For instance, esports broadcasting is typically 
encountered online through platforms such as Twitch and Youtube; 
through these forums many different broadcasters can all be watching 
and describing the same esports event allowing viewers to choose their 
favorite broadcaster.230 This form of broadcasting changes one of the 
more lucrative parts of traditional international sports competitions, 
the national-level sale of broadcast rights. Thirdly, a challenge facing 
the governance of esports is that game preference changes over time, 
some games fall out of favor, and while this has happened with some 
sports at the Olympics and other competitions, in esports the changes 
appear magnified given the relatively recent emergence of the activity. 
It is likely that once various countries show a sustained ability to 
produce top level talent, then the feasibility of international 
governance of the activities will become more stable; but at the 
moment the industry is still in its initial stages of seeing where it fits 
within existing models. The one aspect of the industry that appears to 
clearly fit transnational models is corruption; gambling, match-fixing, 
and doping. While it is uncertain how exactly esports will continue to 
develop on an international stage, it is necessary that efforts to preempt 
esports corruption begin with international cooperation, given the 
portability and intangibility of the emerging gambling markets that 
have fueled nefarious behavior.    
CONCLUSION  
Future regulation of the esports industry is inevitable if the games 
are going to take the next step towards being recognized alongside 
other more traditional sports.231 Various multinational groups are 
attempting to move the esports industry towards better regulations. For 
 
 229.  See Andrew Visnovsky, Growth of Esports: Regulatory Concerns, SPORTS INTEGRITY 
INITIATIVE (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/growth-of-esports-
regulatory-concerns/ 
 230.  See Mary-Ann Russon, What is Twitch and How do I Make Money From It? IBTIMES 
(Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/what-twitch-how-do-i-make-money-it-1435874. 
 231.  See generally Robert Silverman, Why Regulating the Billion-dollar Esports World is 
Nearly Impossible, THE WEEK (Aug. 16, 2016), http://theweek.com/articles/635530/why-
regulating-billiondollar-esports-world-nearly-impossible; Tricia Duryee, ESports Wagering 
Estimated to Hit $23.5B by 2020, Generating Revenues of $1.8B Worldwide, GEEKWIRE (Sept. 
9, 2015, 10:23 AM), http://www.geekwire.com/2015/esports-wagering-estimated-to-hit-23-
5b-by-2020-generating-revenues-of-1-81b-worldwide/; Kane Fulton, The Beautiful Aim: Can 
WESA Fix eSports?, TECHRADER (May 17, 2016), 
http://www.techradar.com/news/gaming/the-beautiful-aim-can-wesa-fix-esports—1321511. 
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example, the Esports Integrity Coalition has proposed various 
standardized policies for esports leagues to adopt.232 Silverman 
observed that as a non-profit startup the Esports Integrity Coalition 
may not have the necessary resources to provide oversight to multiple 
esports leagues.233 In addition to the Esports Integrity Coalition, there 
is also the World Esports Association, supported by multiple 
organizations with the objective of advocating on behalf of players, 
though within two weeks of launching, FaZe Clan left the Association 
citing a lack of transparency.234 Additionally, there is the World 
Esports Council, which launched in 2015 and seeks to provide “an 
overarching governing body.”235 In addition to multinational groups, 
there are also groups that have been formed to specifically address 
issues related to British and French esports industries.236 
According to Green, regulation of the industry and appointment 
of a unifying governing body may serve several functions for 
advancing esports.237 Success of an overarching esports governance 
structure will likely require a large number of organizations coming 
together while delegating some rule making authority from their 
respective organizations.238 However, the most important role that a 
regulatory body may have is its advocacy to governments.239 In 
addition to demonstrating to lawmakers a sense of legitimacy, a 
respected governing body with regulatory teeth may be able to assert 
to lawmakers that the industry is capable of self-regulation and does 
not require governmental intervention. While the future success of 
esports will include numerous challenges, it has arguably survived to 
make it to those future discussions, which is no small feat.240 
 
 232.  Id.  
 233.  Id.  
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Challenges, ESPORTS BETTING REP. (July 12, 2016, 7:13 PM), 
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 235.  Id. 
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 237.  Id.  
 238.  Id.  
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leagues see, e.g. Slamball, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slamball (last visited Jan. 
31, 2017); Robert Wood, Universal Football, TOPEND SPORTS (2016), 
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